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Electronic monitoring in practice: Early Report Briefing from HM Inspectorate of Probation and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services

Published:
Inspection type:
Joint inspection; Thematics – criminal justice joint inspection
Lead inspectorate:
HM Inspectorate of Probation
Participating inspectorate:
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services
Publication date:
2026
Theme:
Community safety; Criminal Justice Joint Inspection

An early briefing, setting out key findings from the thematic criminal justice joint inspection: ‘Electronic monitoring in practice: The police response to electronically monitored bail conditions and the use of electronic monitoring on community sentences and post-release licences’.

The inspection was led by HM Inspectorate of Probation and supported by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, and the full report will be published 26 October 2026.

1.   Inspection summary (Back to top)

This inspection examined the police response to electronically monitored bail conditions and the effectiveness of electronic monitoring (EM) used by the Probation Service. The inspection of electronically monitored bail conditions was undertaken across two police forces. We reviewed force documentation, examined 21 alleged breaches of EM bail cases, and held interviews and focus groups with relevant police personnel. Evidence was supplemented by analysis of all 43 force management statements for 2025 and interviews with national stakeholders.

During probation fieldwork, we inspected the records of 180[1] individuals whose court order or licence conditions included electronic monitoring. Our case sample was drawn from six probation delivery units (PDUs) in six regions, selected to provide a mix of urban and rural areas. Fieldwork included interviews with 147 of the practitioners responsible for supervision of the individuals in our sample, as well as focus groups with additional practitioners, managers, senior leaders and specialist EM teams. We also engaged with external stakeholders, including sentencers in each area. A further week of interviews was undertaken with national stakeholders to explore EM policy, strategy and operational delivery.

2.   Key findings: The police response to electronically monitored bail conditions (Back to top)

The scale and nature of electronically monitored bail conditions

The inspection found that police forces face substantial and growing demand for police action arising from electronically monitored bail conditions. The NPCC EM lead told us that the introduction of the Sentencing Act 2026 and the accompanying changes to the Bail Act 1976 were likely to have a significant impact on the volume of notifications about alleged EM bail breaches.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has forecast a large increase in the number of individuals with EM bail conditions by 31 March 2029. If the number of EM bail breach notifications sent to forces rose at the same rate, this would result in a large increase in police workload. We believe there are opportunities to reduce some of this workload by changing the rules by which the police are told about some alleged EM bail breaches.

The police are expected to inform the Electronic Monitoring Service (EMS) of the action taken in response to each EM bail breach notification. Owing to poor record-keeping and data inaccuracies, we were unable to determine what enforcement action, if any, had been taken in the majority of cases.

Overall, we conclude that the MoJ should publish more information on EM bail conditions to enable the public and other interested parties to better understand their nature and scale, identify what is working well, and highlight areas where improvement is needed.

Policing arrangements

While the national leadership arrangements were well structured, there was limited guidance available to support this work. As a result, the approaches adopted by the forces we visited varied considerably.

The quality of information provided to forces presented significant challenges. Police forces reported frequent inaccuracies in the information received from the EMS and often had to carry out their own validation checks before making enforcement decisions.

The forces visited during fieldwork did not have effective systems for recording EM bail breach notifications. Consequently, they were unable to understand the volume and nature of their response, assess the demands placed on the force, or identify and manage associated risks to the public. Neither force had developed sufficiently mature performance management or scrutiny arrangements to provide effective oversight of this work.

Police response to the Ministry of Justice Electronic Monitoring Court Bail Protocol

The inspection found that the arrangements for managing and responding to EM bail breach notifications were not always operating in the best interests of victims and were not being applied consistently across police forces.

A particular concern was the absence of structured risk assessments. Although the Ministry of Justice Electronic Monitoring Court Bail Protocol requires forces to assess risk when responding to EM bail breach notifications, we found limited evidence that this was being done consistently. As a result, it was not always clear whether victims’ safety and safeguarding considerations had informed enforcement decisions.

We found that safeguarding referrals were not always made when EM bail breach notifications were about children. We also found that forces did not consistently record the rationale for decisions about enforcement action. This limited transparency and made it difficult to assess whether appropriate decisions had been made.

Police officers told us that defendants arrested for alleged EM bail breaches were sometimes released by the courts subject to the same conditions they had previously breached. We were told that this could occur repeatedly, and our fieldwork case assessments identified examples of this.

While we observed some examples of innovative and effective practice, the overall picture suggests that police systems and processes have not kept pace with the increasing scale and complexity of EM bail arrangements. As a result, forces are not always able to respond to breaches in a consistent, risk-informed and victim-focused way.

Victim contact

The Ministry of Justice Electronic Monitoring Court Bail Protocol and the Victims’ Code do not require the police to inform victims about alleged EM bail breaches. However, we consider it important that victims are updated in appropriate cases about alleged breaches and any action taken by the police in response. This is particularly important in domestic abuse cases, where an alleged breach may indicate an increased risk to the victim’s safety.

Our inspection also found that, in some cases, victims were not informed of the outcome of court bail hearings. This meant that victims were not always provided with information that could be relevant to their safety, wellbeing and ability to make informed decisions about their circumstances.

EM bail breach notifications: Statistics

There are no published statistics on the number of EM bail breach notifications received by police forces to help understand the demands on policing and the wider criminal justice system.

The EMS shared unpublished management information with us as part of our inspection. We have not quoted figures here because the Ministry of Justice had only recently obtained the data. Quality assurance was still ongoing, and the final figures were not yet available for publication. However, the data helped us to understand the scale of demand

The data showed a large number of EM bail breach notifications were sent to all forces in England and Wales. Each individual defendant also generated multiple EM breach notifications in short periods of time. We found examples of this in our fieldwork.

The police should tell the EMS what they have decided to do about each EM bail breach notification. The EMS data showed police often had not updated the EMS about their decision on enforcement action. The number of times the police updated the EMS varied substantially by individual force. Of the times that the police did update the EMS about a decision, most were about the fact that the police had decided to take no further action.

EM bail breach notifications: Case study

One defendant was charged with a serious act of stalking his ex-partner. The police refused bail and he appeared at court. The court bailed the defendant with EM conditions, including to wear an EM GPS device.

Five days later the EMS sent the force an EM bail breach notification because the defendant had apparently entered the exclusion zone that had been part of his bail conditions. For each of the next 10 days the EMS sent the force EM bail breach notifications for the same reason. The police then arrested the defendant and took him to court, but the court bailed him with the same EM bail conditions.

The EMS sent the force further EM bail breach notifications on 22 different days. The police then arrested the defendant again and put him before the court, but the court again released him with the same EM bail conditions.

Six days later the EMS sent the force another EM bail breach notification. The police arrested the defendant eight days after this. The defendant appeared at court, but again he was released with the same EM bail conditions.

Over a month later, the victim contacted the police and reported further instances of stalking. Three days later the EMS sent the police a further EM bail breach notification because of an apparent breach of the exclusion zone condition of his EM court bail conditions. Three days later the force circulated the defendant as being wanted on the Police National Computer.

Nine days later, the police arrested the defendant. The court sentenced the defendant to 36 weeks’ imprisonment for stalking, and the defendant was given a three-year restraining order.

We did not find any evidence that the police had conducted risk assessments in this case.

3.   Key findings: The use of electronic monitoring in community sentences and post-release licences (Back to top)

EM is playing an increasingly prominent role in probation work and is now expected to support a wide range of objectives, including public protection, victim safety, rehabilitation and compliance. Against a backdrop of significant prison overcrowding, it is increasingly relied on as an alternative to custody. The introduction of the Sentencing Act 2026 has accelerated this trend further, increasing both the number of people subject to monitoring and the demands placed on those responsible for delivering and responding to it.

In this section we present key themes and some data from this inspection’s probation casework findings, based on the 180 cases we inspected. HM Inspectorate of Probation’s fieldwork focused on the use of EM in community sentences and post-release licences, considering whether the governance, systems, processes and partnership arrangements supporting EM are sufficiently mature and resilient to keep pace with its growing use.

  • While investment, new technology, and stronger governance arrangements have expanded the use of EM, frontline practice has not kept pace. Significant gaps remain between the ambitions for EM and how effectively it is being used in practice.
  • Too often, EM is treated as an administrative process focused on fitting tags and recording compliance, rather than as a meaningful tool to support rehabilitation, protect victims and reduce reoffending. In the cases we inspected, we found that patterns of behaviour were not consistently discussed with monitored individuals or used to inform risk analysis.
  • Although leadership and governance have improved since our previous inspection, significant operational weaknesses remain, for example:
    • no single trusted source of data about who is being monitored and who is not
    • heavy reliance on manual work to reconcile information from different systems
    • fragmented processes and poor integration between digital platforms.
  • We found limited evidence that outcomes, such as improved public protection or reduced reoffending, are being measured effectively.
  • The effectiveness of EM depends on it being in place when it is needed. However, delays in fitting equipment remain common. Of the 180 individual cases inspected, inspectors found that:
    • only 55 per cent of GPS and radio frequency tags were fitted promptly[2]
    • only 60 per cent of alcohol monitoring tags were fitted promptly
    • around one in five people waited more than two weeks for GPS or radio frequency monitoring
    • almost one in 10 did not have EM equipment assigned up to five months after the requirement had been imposed
    • performance measures focused on whether fitting attempts had been made, rather than whether monitoring had started successfully.
  • Inspectors found a range of reasons for tags not being fitted promptly. In some instances, the individual due to be tagged did not make themselves available, while in others, the processes required to initiate tagging were not followed or contained errors, resulting in delays.
  • Practitioners are not making full use of monitoring data
    • GPS technology has the potential to provide valuable information about behaviour, compliance and risk. Yet inspectors found monitoring data was often underused.Minor violations of EM were raised and explored with individuals in just 55 per cent of applicable inspected cases, and major violations in just 46 per cent of relevant cases.[3]Many practitioners reported difficulties accessing information and lacked confidence in analysing or applying it. In some cases, monitoring data that could have informed risk management, safeguarding or victim protection was never requested or reviewed by practitioners. This suggests that opportunities to use technology to strengthen supervision and improve outcomes were frequently missed.
    • Inspectors found that only:
      • 34 per cent of case reviews by practitioners were informed by monitoring data
      • 24 per cent of reviews considered the impact of EM on offending-related factors.
  • Risks to victims are not being managed effectively enough. Inspectors found that:
    • Sufficient attention was given to protecting actual or potential victims in only 45 per cent of relevant cases
    • Information-sharing and multi-agency coordination were effective in only around half of cases.
    • EM conditions were often not embedded into wider safeguarding and risk management activity.
    • EM can sometimes create a false sense of security if it is assumed to manage risk without active oversight and professional judgement.
  • Electronic monitoring is often disconnected from rehabilitation.
    • Inspectors found little evidence that electronic monitoring was being used consistently to promote behaviour change.
    • Practitioners generally understood the risks and needs of the people they supervised, but often failed to explain how monitoring would contribute to:
      • reducing reoffending
      • supporting rehabilitation
      • protecting the public
      • encouraging long-term desistance.
  • Reviews rarely considered whether monitoring was achieving its intended purpose or remained necessary and proportionate. In the cases where it was relevant to do so, only 23 per cent demonstrated sufficient planning for the end of the monitoring period.

Looking ahead

The full report makes a number of recommendations to the Ministry of Justice, HM Prison and Probation Service, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for EM. These cover a range of issues, including the urgent need to:

  • improve the quality and reliability of data
  • make monitoring information easier for practitioners to access and use
  • simplify complex operational processes
  • strengthen the way monitoring is integrated into risk management and rehabilitation
  • develop stronger evidence about whether EM is improving public protection and reducing reoffending.

Electronic monitoring – key statistics

27,847The number of individuals with EM orders assigned with EM equipment on 30 June 20261
25,533The number of individuals with EM orders assigned with EM equipment on 30 June 20251
10,844The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment under post-release licence conditions on 30 June 20261
9,423The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment under post-release licence conditions on 30 June 20251
3,914The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment being electronically monitored as part of community orders or suspended sentence orders on 30 June 20261
3, 455The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment being electronically monitored as part of community orders or suspended sentence orders on 30 June 20251
8,970The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment subject to electronically monitored court bail on 30 June 20261
8,392The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment subject to electronically monitored court bail on 30 June 20251

Types of electronic monitoring – key statistics

16,034The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment being monitored via GPS tags on 30 June 20261
8,241The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment being monitored via radio frequency curfew tags on 30 June 20261
5,130The number of individuals assigned with EM equipment being monitored via alcohol monitoring tags on 30 June 20261

Individual not assigned with EM equipment – key statistics

5,0432The number of individuals with electronic monitoring orders in place but not assigned equipment on 30 June 20263
2,704The number of individuals with electronically monitored court bail in place but not assigned equipment on 30 June 20263
1,585The number of individuals with post-release licence conditions in place but not assigned equipment for EM on 30 June 20263
608The number of individuals with community orders or suspended sentence orders requirements in place but not assigned equipment for EM on 30 June 20263

1Ministry of Justice (July 2026). Electronic Monitoring Statistics Publication, England and Wales: June 2026.  https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electronic-monitoring-statistics-publication-june-2026/electronic-monitoring-statistics-publication-england-and-wales-june-2026

2This number also includes 146 individuals who should be assigned EM equipment under immigration bail.

3 Ministry of Justice (July 2026). Annex: Management Information, Electronic Monitoring Status Statistics: June 2026. https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/electronic-monitoring-statistics-publication-june-2026/annex-management-information-electronic-monitoring-status-statistics-june-2026

Electronic monitoring: Case studies

Prisons now use the Create an Electronic Monitoring Order (CEMO) platform to request monitoring from EMS. However, at the time of our inspection, probation practitioners did not have access to this system and therefore could not see the final instructions submitted to EMS. As a result, they could not assure themselves that monitoring arrangements accurately reflected the intended licence conditions. This created a recurring risk that practitioners believed monitoring was in place when EMS had either not been instructed to monitor a condition or was unable to do so because of incomplete or inaccurate information. Our case inspections identified multiple examples where this had occurred, demonstrating gaps between intended licence conditions and the monitoring arrangements ultimately implemented. An example is provided below:

Gerry served a custodial sentence for an offence of affray and was released on home detention curfew. Pre-release planning also indicated that he should have an electronically monitored exclusion zone for a period that extended beyond the initial curfew period. This was to prevent him going to places where identified individuals were potentially at risk from him.

Communication from EMS about the initial fitting of equipment did not make clear what had been installed and for what purpose. While there was some communication with EMS on release to establish what EM was active, the arrangements to monitor the exclusion zone were not put in place until 41 days afterwards.

Once monitoring was in place, it quickly showed that Gerry was entering his exclusion zone and enforcement action was taken. The poor communication and delays in this case meant an important part of Gerry’s risk management was not in place during the early part of his release. In addition, no action was taken to mitigate the risks and support the safety of those deemed to be at risk from Gerry.

Timely installation of monitoring equipment remained a significant challenge. Delays reduced the effectiveness of EM at the point when monitoring was intended to provide the greatest level of structure, oversight and risk management. The example below typifies some of the issues we saw in practice:

Paul was convicted of a racially aggravated public order offence following an incident involving his former partner and subsequent abuse towards emergency service workers.

On release, he was due to be managed under the DAPOL (Domestic Abuse Perpetrators on Licence) scheme, with both alcohol monitoring and GPS trail monitoring. In practice, the intended monitoring arrangements were not fully implemented. Paul was released to CAS3 accommodation (Probation Service-approved temporary accommodation) where a poor mobile signal affected communication and the effectiveness of monitoring arrangements.

His GPS trail monitoring tag was never fitted, and there were significant delays in installing the alcohol monitoring tag, despite persistent efforts by the probation practitioner to resolve the issue. Requests for specific appointment times were made because of communication difficulties at the property, but responses from the provider were often vague. One installation attempt was aborted because the visit was undertaken by a single officer, despite records indicating that a two-person crew was required. Once fitted, the alcohol tag was loose and caused blistering. Concerns raised by the practitioner and Paul were not addressed promptly, and support from the provider was limited.

Paul’s practitioner acknowledged that they lacked confidence in interpreting alcohol monitoring data and had limited trust in the information being provided. As a result, the monitoring information was rarely used to inform supervision. Alleged tamper events may have been linked to the poor fit of the tag, but this was not explored and no enforcement action followed.

There were also concerns that Paul may have renewed contact with his former partner. Information from family members suggested this may have been occurring, but the absence of GPS monitoring meant there was no location data available to explore his movements or test these concerns. Difficulties with EM delivery were not escalated to resolve them and opportunities to use monitoring information to support risk management were missed.

This case demonstrates how delays in implementation, poor communication, lack of confidence in monitoring data and failure to escalate persistent provider issues can significantly reduce the value of EM as a public protection and risk management tool.

Several managers described GPS trail monitoring as an underused resource that was often included as a licence condition or requirement but not fully integrated into ongoing case management. There was widespread recognition that simply imposing GPS monitoring did not improve risk management unless practitioners were actively reviewing and using the information it generated. The case below provides an example of this:

Mike received a custodial sentence for a serious assault against his partner. His criminal record and police intelligence showed previous domestic abuse involving other partners. He was assessed as posing a high risk of serious harm. Mike was subject to a restraining order prohibiting contact with the victim of the index offence or entering areas where she lived and worked. He was also restricted from seeing his children under safeguarding arrangements. 

On release on home detention curfew, in addition to curfew, his licence included a GPS trail monitoring condition and alcohol monitoring. While the restraining order aimed to protect the victim by preventing Mike from going to certain areas, this restriction was not replicated as an electronically monitored licence condition. This was a missed opportunity to strengthen protection of the victim and support risk management through the available technology.

Mike’s release plan did not set out how GPS trail monitoring would inform supervision, public protection activity or information-sharing with partner agencies. Following release, the monitoring equipment was installed promptly, and the requirements were explained to Mike at his first probation appointment.

During the licence period, the alcohol monitoring requirement was used effectively, and the practitioner undertook constructive relapse prevention work, helping Mike to understand the relationship between alcohol use and offending behaviour. However, despite the risks identified in the assessment, no requests were made for GPS trail monitoring data during the supervision period. Accessing and reviewing trail monitoring data could have provided valuable information about his movements to understand whether he was visiting his children or going into the areas prohibited under the restraining order. Of particular concern was the fact that children’s social care services had been informed that Mike’s whereabouts were being monitored, which created a risk of false reassurance.

Although monitoring technology was fitted and functioning as intended, opportunities to use GPS data proactively to inform risk management, safeguard children and strengthen victim protection were missed.

Where information resulting from EM was actively used as part of supervision we found a range of positive effects.  The following example demonstrates effective practice, with alcohol abstinence monitoring fully integrated into sentence planning:

Robert was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment for blackmail and was released on home detention curfew. In addition to the standard curfew monitoring, he was made subject to an alcohol abstinence requirement. The decision to impose alcohol monitoring was supported by a thorough pre-release assessment, which identified a clear relationship between alcohol use and previous offending behaviour.

Assessment and planning in this case were of a high standard. The practitioner demonstrated a strong understanding of the factors contributing to Robert’s offending and analysed how both forms of EM used in the case could help to reduce the risk of further offending. The assessment included a clear rationale for the alcohol abstinence condition, which was fully integrated into the risk management and contingency plans. These plans clearly set out the actions required if monitoring identified alcohol use, including the sharing of information with relevant agencies. They also detailed the response if the tag was removed for any reason, considering enforcement action where removal was deliberate and alternative measures, such as alcohol testing, to mitigate risk where appropriate.

The practitioner maintained effective oversight of EM throughout the licence period. Alcohol monitoring information was routinely reviewed, and any breaches or concerns were addressed promptly through discussion with the senior probation officer, ensuring that responses were proportionate and consistent. Communication with the EM provider was timely and effective, which facilitated prompt resolution of issues and maintained confidence in the monitoring arrangements.Importantly, the practitioner did not view the alcohol monitoring solely as a tool for monitoring compliance. Before the requirement ended, they reviewed Robert’s progress and considered how the positive changes achieved during the monitoring period could be sustained once the external controls were removed.

This case demonstrates how well-informed assessment and planning can ensure that EM is used purposefully, with clear links to risk management, contingency planning and long-term rehabilitation.

This is a positive practice example of effective use of GPS monitoring data:

Wayne was serving a community order for common assault and battery against his former partner. Their young son was present during the offence and witnessed the assault. The order included a Building Choices programme requirement, Rehabilitation Activity Requirement (RAR) days, unpaid work, GPS trail monitoring and an exclusion zone.

The case demonstrated effective use of GPS trail monitoring data. Monitoring information identified that Wayne was no longer living at his approved address, despite presenting as compliant during supervision appointments. Rather than relying solely on self-reporting, the probation practitioner used GPS data to establish Wayne’s movements and verify concerns regarding his living arrangements.The practitioner worked closely with the police and children’s social care services to assess and manage the implications of Waynes’s undisclosed change of address, particularly as he was believed to be residing with a new partner who had children. This ensured that safeguarding concerns were identified promptly and that appropriate measures could be put in place to protect those potentially affected.

This case illustrates how GPS trail monitoring data can provide valuable independent information to test compliance, verify living arrangements and inform safeguarding activity. It also demonstrates the importance of combining EM with professional curiosity, effective partnership working and proportionate decision-making to support public protection and risk management.

4.   Chief Inspector of Probation, Martin Jones and HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Michelle Skeer (Back to top)

HM Chief Inspector of Probation, Martin Jones CBE, said:

“The findings of our inspection are clear: electronic monitoring is expanding rapidly, but the systems, processes and frontline practice needed to make it effective have not kept pace. Until those issues are addressed, the criminal justice system risks relying on a technology whose potential is not being fully realised.

“There is a real danger that electronic monitoring creates a false sense of assurance if the technology is not matched by effective professional practice. Expanding tagging programmes without addressing their weaknesses risks overpromising and underdelivering on public protection.”

HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Service, Michelle Skeer OBE QPM, said:

“Our inspection found dedicated officers and staff working hard to respond to a substantial and increasing demand. But national guidance was limited, and systems and processes in different police forces varied considerably.

“In the cases we examined, alleged breaches of electronically monitored bail conditions did not consistently lead to structured consideration of risk to victims, witnesses or the wider public. Poor record-keeping, information-gathering and analysis made it difficult for forces to understand either the demand generated by electronically monitored bail or the effectiveness of their response”.

Footnotes (Back to top)

[1] Individual cases were selected from long lists provided by each of the six PDUs. The sample does not match the proportions of the differing types of EM across PDUs or nationally, but was designed to ensure that a sufficient number of each type of EM was included. It should therefore not be seen as representative of all EM cases.

[2] Contractual arrangements require EMS to make two attempts to fit tagging equipment no later than midnight the day after the date on which monitoring requirements begin. Inspectors used this as a guide but made judgements based on what could reasonably expected in the case.

[3] We classified minor violations as low‑level, non‑intentional, or limited instances of non‑compliance that did not fundamentally compromise monitoring, for example a late return for curfew of a short period of time. Major violations involve intentional or serious breaches that directly undermine the integrity of the EM requirement, for example intentional damage to or removal of a tag.